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Abstract
Models of stabilization in open economy traditionally emphasize the role of exchange
rates as a substitute for nominal price ￿exibility in fostering relative price adjustment. This
view has been recently criticized on the ground that, to the extent that prices are sticky in
local currency, the exchange rate does not play the stabilizing role envisioned by the received
wisdom. An important question is whether, for this very reason, stabilization policies should
limit exchange rate movements, or even eliminate them altogether. In this paper, I re-assess
this issue by extending the Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) model to allow for home bias in
consumption | so that I can exploit the advantages of closed-form solutions. While this
extension leaves most properties of the model una￿ected, home bias implies that the real
exchange rate in an e￿cient equilibrium is not constant, but ￿uctuates with the terms
of trade. The weight that monetary authorities optimally place on stabilizing domestic
marginal costs is increasing in Home bias. With asymmetric shocks, ￿xed exchange rates
are incompatible with e￿cient monetary rules. Yet, the adverse welfare consequences of
exchange rate movements constrain the optimal intensity of monetary responses to domestic
shocks. Openness matters: the larger the import content of consumption, the lower the
exchange rate volatility implied by optimal stabilization rules.
JEL classi￿cation: E31, E52, F42
Keywords: optimal monetary policy, nominal rigidities, exchange rate
pass-through, exchange rate regimes, international cooperation.
￿Preliminary version. I thank Maurice Obstfeld for comments. Corsetti’s work on this paper is part of the
Pierre Werner Chair Programme on Monetary Union, at the Robert Schuman Center of the European University
Institute. Financial support from the programme is gratefully acknowledged.1. Introduction
According to the received wisdom about optimal stabilization policy in the presence of country-
speci￿c shocks, exchange rate movements are an essential mechanism to regulate international
relative prices adjustment in the presence of nominal rigidities. Thus optimal monetary rules
should not oppose, but favor exchange rate movements as a way to overcome ine￿ciency due to
price stickiness (e.g. Friedman 1953, Mundell 1963). Recent literature, however, has questioned
the received wisdom, by stressing evidence on the stability of import price in local currency.
Indeed, to the extent that import prices are sticky in the importer currency because of nomi-
nal frictions1, exchange rate movements do not perform the stabilizing role envisioned by the
traditional model of international transmission. Namely, with enough nominal frictions in local
currency, nominal depreciation improves (rather than worsening) a country’s terms of trade (by
raising revenues in domestic currency from sales abroad). There are no expenditure switching
e￿ects from exchange rate movements: consumer prices are essentially unresponsive to the ex-
change rate. When domestic monetary authorities try to stabilize the output gap, exchange rate
changes tend to move the economy away from the e￿cient allocation. For this reason, it now
well understood that, with nominal frictions in local currency, domestic and foreign monetary
authorities should optimally stabilize some weighted average of domestic and foreign produc-
ers’ marginal costs. Such policy tends to reduce exchange rate volatility relative to the case
of inward-looking stabilization of domestic output gaps (see Corsetti and Pesenti (2005b) for a
stylized analytical and graphical survey of the literature on this issue).
These results are typically derived in the framework of models which can be solved in closed
form after Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) and Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (2002), in turn heavily indebted
to Cole and Obstfeld (1991). In these models, the assumption of identical preferences of con-
sumers in di￿erent countries implies that, when export prices are set in local currency, the
optimal monetary stance is perfectly symmetric at Home and abroad. In other words, when
monetary policy is optimally conducted, the exchange rate does not ￿uctuate at all in response
to contingent shocks. Devereux and Engel (2003) | henceforth DE | suggests a strong in-
terpretation of this result, as a new and distinct argument in favor of ￿xed exchange rates, as
attribute and implication of e￿cient stabilization rules.2 Loosely speaking, since with nominal
rigidities in local currency exchange rate movements do not perform any role as automatic sta-
bilizers of relative prices (as emphasized by the received wisdom), it is e￿cient to eliminate their
￿uctuations altogether.3
In this paper I will reconsider the case for exchange rate ￿exibility extending previous work
with Paolo Pesenti model to economies that di￿er in their degree of openness. The new version
of the Corsetti-Pesenti model incorporates home bias in consumption preferences, yet can still
be solved in closed form. The crucial assumption is that consumption preferences in the Home
and Foreign country are Cobb-Douglas with symmetric weights on goods produced domestically
1There is a considerable debate regarding the cause of local-currency price stability of imports. Burstein,
Neves, and Rebelo (2001) and Corsetti and Dedola (2005) stress that an important contributing factor is the
presence of distribution services intensive in local inputs. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2005) show that allowing
for distribution improve the performance of models with nominal rigidities.
2In the economy examined by DE, however, it may still be optimal to let the exchange rate depreciate along
a trend, if countries have di￿erent preferences over in￿ation rates in the long run.
3Note that this argument is independent of the e￿ect of such regime in limiting discretion by central banks,
as a way to contain the undesirable consequences of lack of credibility.
2and abroad (i.e. the degree of Home bias is identical). As in the original version of the model,
terms of trade movements minimize consumption risk of productivity shocks even if there is not
international market for assets. Di￿erent from the original Corsetti-Pesenti formulation, with
￿exible prices the real exchange rate is no longer constant, but moves in proportion to the terms
of trade. The stronger the home bias (i.e. the closer the economy), the stronger the correlation
between real exchange rate and the terms of trade.
Because of home bias, e￿cient stabilization policy cannot be generally implemented if the
exchange rate is ￿xed. We have mentioned above that, with prices sticky in local currency,
e￿cient monetary rules will stabilize a weighted average of domestic and foreign marginal costs
(output gaps), with the same weights of domestic and imported goods as in the consumption
price index. When there is Home bias, asymmetric shocks across countries imply that domestic
monetary authorities will place more weight on their national output gap and marginal costs.
Hence the welfare-maximizing monetary stance will be di￿erent across countries, implying some
degree of exchange rate volatility. Even if with local currency prices exchange rate movements do
not generate any e￿cient adjustment in relative prices, a low weight of imports in consumption
tends to raise the importance of domestic policy trade-o￿s in optimal policy design. The adverse
welfare consequences of exchange rate movements constrain the intensity of the optimal policy
response to domestic shocks.
Openness matters: optimal monetary rules turns o￿ exchange rate variability in the limiting
case of no home bias in domestic expenditure | as in the DE contribution; but moving away
from this limiting case in any direction will restore the desirability of ￿exible exchange rates. In
particular, raising the degree of home bias will lead monetary authorities to place more weight
on domestic marginal costs stabilization. As the monetary stance in each country becomes more
responsive to domestic productivity shocks, the volatility of the exchange rate correspondingly
rises. Overall, the relation between openness and exchange rate volatility is non linear in the
Home bias. A strong bias for Foreign goods would also correspond to high exchange rate
volatility, although optimal policies would be mainly concerned with marginal costs of Foreign
￿rms.
This paper complements the analysis by Duarte and Obstfeld (2004) | henceforth DO
| who emphasize that in the DE economy ￿xed exchange rates are e￿cient because the real
exchange rate would be constant with ￿exible prices. DO consider a version of the same model
augmented with a nontraded good sector in each country (as in Obstfeld and Rogo￿ 2002),
allowing for economy-wide shocks hitting both sectors symmetrically. Since shocks to nontraded
good sectors are not perfectly correlated across countries, optimal monetary rules will not imply
the same monetary stance at Home and abroad. In general, policymakers face a trade-o￿ between
stabilizing marginal costs of ￿rms producing traded goods and ￿rms producing nontraded goods.
Adopting a ￿xed exchange rate regime would impose an excessily strict constraint on policy
making. While my argument does not rely on sectoral di￿erences, the essence of the mechanism
is the same.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 revisit the analysis in Corsetti-Pesenti introduc-
ing home bias in preferences. Section 3 characterizes the e￿cient allocation, while Sections 4 and
5 analyzes optimal stabilization rules. Section 5 concludes. The appendix presents analytical
details about the model.
32. The Corsetti-Pesenti model with home bias
The model consists of two countries, each specialized in the production of one good. Technol-
ogy is linear in labor only, with random productivity. There is monopolistic competition in
production and ￿rms are subject to nominal rigidities: they preset the price of their product
for one period. Preferences are additive separable: utility from the consumption basket is in
logarithmic form, disutility from labor is linear. The elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods is equal to one, i.e. the consumption aggregator is Cobb-Douglas. As in Cole
and Obstfeld (1991), this implies that, in a ￿ex price equilibrium, consumption risk is e￿ciently
shared via terms of trade movements, independently of the presence of assets markets. Corsetti
and Pesenti (2001) shows that the same argument goes through (and the model can be solved
in closed form) also in production economies, and in the presence of nominal rigidities.
Since the speci￿cation of this model is well-known, in the text I will only discuss the novel
feature I introduce in the speci￿cation | leaving analytical details to the appendix. Namely,
let Ct and C￿
t denote consumption at Home and in the Foreign country. Let CH and CF denote
consumption of Home and Foreign goods by domestic households | C￿
H and C￿
F are similarly










In each country, a fraction ￿ of consumption expenditure falls on domestically produced goods.
As long as ￿ > 1=2, there will be home bias in consumption. Namely, let P denote the price level
in the Home country, while PH is the price of the Home produced consumption good. Then,
the optimal consumption plan by the Home representative household prescribes:
PHCH = ￿PC
By the same token, the optimal consumption expenditure on domestic goods by the foreign
representative household will be
PFCF = ￿P￿C￿
where prices in foreign currency and foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. Note that
the degree of home bias is symmetric across border.
The above is an important improvement over the original version of my model with Paolo
Pesenti. In its original version, the speci￿cation has identical consumption aggregators across
countries. In other words, domestic and foreign households have identical preferences over the
consumption of Home (Foreign) goods: hence the share of private expenditure falling on the
Home goods will be identical in either country. In this paper, I show that this assumption is
not necessary to derive a closed form solution. This extension of the Corsetti-Pesenti framework
removes an important constraint limiting the scope of the model, as regards it ability to address
issues related to openness.
Home bias is the only new feature that I introduce in the model speci￿cation. As shown in
the appendix, the solution of the new model is mostly una￿ected, except for the behavior of the
real exchange rate. To see this, the domestic welfare-based CPI in the Home country is:
Pt =
1






4whereas PH;t and PF;t are the usual CES price indexes aggregating prices of di￿erent varieties













Let E denote the nominal exchange rate, and TOT the Home terms of trade, i.e. the price of
imports by the Home country in terms of the price of its exports (TOT￿ are similarly de￿ned).











In general, the real exchange rate will not be constant, but will ￿uctuate with the terms of trade.
Consumption is equalized across countries in PPP terms, not in quantities.
It is instructive to look at possible equilibria di￿ering in the pricing assumptions. With

















Observe that, without home bias (￿ = 1=2), terms of trade movements do not impinge on the
real exchange rate, which is identically equal to one. As the degree of home bias increases, the
comovement between the real exchange rate and the terms of trade becomes stricter. Thus,
given the stochastic process driving productivity shocks and therefore the equilibrium terms of
trade, the volatility of the real exchange rate will be increasing with the degree of home bias:
the closer the economy, the higher the volatility of RER. This relation appears to be consistent
with empirical evidence, e.g. Hau (2002).
The above formula also applies to an equilibrium with nominal rigidities, whereas exports
prices are preset in the producers’ currency | the case of ‘Producer Currency Pricing’ or ‘PCP.’
The terms of trade will move one to one with the nominal exchange rate. The real exchange
rate, instead, will move by a fraction of the terms of trade:
[ RER = (2￿ ￿ 1) [ TOT = (2￿ ￿ 1) b E
where a \ b " denotes the percent change of a variable. Once again: other things equal, the closer
a country, the stronger the correlation between RER and TOT; without home bias, the real
exchange rate would be constant.
When export prices are preset in the currency of the market of destination | this is the Local
Currency Pricing, or LCP case | the Home and Foreign terms of trade are not the reciprocal





















Note that, with sticky prices (PCP or LCP), the real exchange rate moves together with the
nominal one. Thus, the volatility of the real exchange rate depends on the characteristics of
optimal monetary policy in the two countries.
5The Corsetti-Pesenti model in its original formulation can be derived as a special case of the
above setting ￿ = 1=2. The appendix shows that, after allowing for home bias, most properties
of the model remain largely una￿ected.
3. An e￿cient allocation with positive terms of trade spillovers
This section analyzes the e￿cient allocation in the model with home bias in preferences, and
relate it to the ￿ex-price equilibrium allocation. We start by describing technology, resource
constraints and preferences. Let ‘ denote labor and Z labor productivity in the Home economy.
With linear production function, the resource constraint of the economy is
Z‘ = CH + C￿
H
















As in Cole and Obstfeld (1991), the planner problem consists of maximizing some weighted



















where P:O: stands for Pareto Optimum. In this allocation consumption risk sharing is ensured
by the fact that world supply of each product is consumed by households in proportion of their























Labor is always at its e￿cient level ‘P:O: = (‘￿)
P:O: = 1=￿, which is constant.
A ￿exible price equilibrium supports the same allocation of consumption as above, once
output and consumption are scaled down by a constant proportional to ￿rms’ markup | i.e.
6consumption and employment are lower than e￿cient due to monopolistic distortions in pro-
duction. For simplicity, I will proceed by assuming complete markets from the start.
With CES preferences over di￿erent varieties/brands of the same good, ￿rms set prices by
charging a constant markup over marginal costs. Let ￿ denote the elasticity of substitution
among varieties of the Home (Foreign) goods, and MC denote marginal costs, consisting of unit
labor costs. In a symmetric equilibrium









With competitive labor markets, the ￿rst order conditions of the Home representative households
implies that equilibrium nominal wages are proportional to PC (P￿C￿ in the foreign country).
Using these results together with the resource constraint, and the fact that consumers spend a





￿ ￿ ‘ <
1
￿
Due to monopolistic distortions, employment will be a fraction
￿ ￿ 1
￿
of its Pareto-optimal level.
With e￿cient consumption risk sharing (PC = EP￿C￿), the value of consumption is iden-























expressions implying exactly the same ratio of Home to Foreign consumption as in an e￿cient
equilibrium. It also follows that consumption demand for each good will be the e￿cient share
of available output. For the Home good demand, we can write:
PC = PHYH ) ￿PHCH = PHYH ) CH = ￿YH
Similar expressions can be derived for C￿
F, as well as for C￿
H and CF, whereas the latter will be
be a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of the corresponding output.
While I have assumed complete markets from the start, following the steps laid out by
Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), one can show that the same allocation is supported in equilibrium
in a world economy with no international asset market (provided that there is no predetermined
stock of international debt in the economy). Terms of trade movements insure that consumption
risk of productivity shocks is e￿ciently shared.
4. Optimal stabilization policies and exchange rate ￿exibility
This and the next section characterize optimal policy stabilization rules in economies with
nominal frictions. The main goal is to study the role of openness in shaping optimal monetary
7rules and therefore exchange rate ￿exibility. In particular, we will show that, with home bias
(￿ > 1=2), no solution to the policy makers’ problem is compatible with a ￿xed exchange rate
regime | although optimal rules may somewhat limit currency ￿uctuations. In doing so, we will
revisit and generalize some of the results established by the literature.4 As in previous work,
I will not specify the instruments used by the policymakers. Rather I will maximize welfare
relative to an indicator of monetary stance de￿ned as
￿ = PC; ￿￿ = P￿C￿
assuming that (whatever the instrument used) monetary authorities have perfect commitment.
In the text I will also abstract from the demand for money, which is however discussed in
appendix. Note that, using the above indicator, perfect risk sharing implies that the nominal






and nominal wages are W = ￿￿ and W￿ = ￿￿￿.
De￿ne expected utility as W = E(U) and W￿ = E(U￿). In the absence of international
coordination, Home policymakers determine their optimal monetary stance by maximizing W
with respect to ￿ while taking ￿￿ as given. Foreign authorities behave in the same way. The





To characterize cooperative policymaking, instead, we posit that policymakers jointly maximize












whereas the weights coincide with the size of each country.
A useful property of the Corsetti-Pesenti speci￿cation is that, independently of nominal
rigidities as well as of Home bias, labor is always equal to its natural rate in expectations:
Et￿1(‘t) = ￿ ‘:
In expected terms, the economy always operates at the constant level of employment charac-
terizing the allocation with ￿exible prices (although actual employment may ￿uctuates with
shocks). Thanks to this property, expected utility is not a function of monetary policy rules.
Thus welfare can be analyzed by focusing on consumption only:
W = Et￿1 lnCt + constant (independent of ￿)
= Et￿1 [ln￿t ￿ lnPt] + constant (independent of ￿)
4An incomplete list discussing optimal policies in open economies without using models which can be solved
in closed form includes Benigno and Benigno (2004), Clarida Gali and Gertler (2001), Gal￿ ￿ and Monacelli (2005),
Kollman (2002, 2004), Monacelli (2003), Monacelli and Faia (2004), Smets and Wouters (2002), Sutherland
(2005).
8A second useful property is that optimally preset prices can be written as a markup over expected
marginal costs, expressed in the appropriate currency. For the PCP economy, for instance, we
have:


















The law of one price holds: once goods prices are expressed in the same currency, identical goods
have the same price. Moreover, the exchange rate pass-through is complete: import prices move
one to one with the exchange rate.
Before examining the economy with LCP, it is useful to analyze brie￿y optimal policy in
model with producer currency pricing. This allows us to present a straightforward case for
optimal policy rules which are completely \inward looking", in the sense that policymakers
focus exclusively on stabilizing the domestic output gap, so that, independently of home bias,
exchange rate in a fully stabilized economy ￿uctuates with relative productivity innovations
across countries.
When exports are priced in the currency of the producer, the policy problems at Home and
in the Foreign country are:
max
￿t
Et￿1 (lnCt) = Et￿1
￿








t ) = Et￿1
￿
ln￿￿




Substituting out the exchange rate and abstracting from constant terms we can also write:
max
￿t
Et￿1 (lnCt) = Et￿1
￿




+ (1 ￿ ￿)ln￿￿








Et￿1 (lnCt) = Et￿1
￿
￿ ln￿￿



























Home monetary policy responds one-to-one to real shocks, stabilizing Home ￿rms’ marginal
costs. A positive innovation in Home productivity is matched by an increase in domestic demand
(via an expansionary monetary stance), which also depreciates the currency. As domestic goods
become cheaper in the world economy (the Home terms of trade deteriorate), Foreign demand for
Home goods rises as well. The exchange rate movement is e￿cient, in the sense that international
relative prices move in the same direction as in the ￿exible price economy studied in the previous
section | essentially the point stressed by Clarida Gertler and Gali (2001).
As is well known, with PCP, implementing optimal policy rules at Home and in the Foreign
country supports a ￿ex-price allocation. This can be easily veri￿ed by noting that the above ￿rst-
order conditions are solved by ￿t = &tZt and ￿￿
t = &￿
t Z￿
t , whereas & and &￿ are some (possibly
9time varying) constant. Policy rules satisfying these conditions would completely stabilized
marginal costs. Demand moves with productivity, making sure that no output/employment
gap is ever opened, and making import prices move e￿ciently with the exchange rate. Note
that policymakers optimally stabilize the GDP de￿ator, but not the CPI, which ￿uctuates to
accommodate relative price movements.
With PCP, home bias is not relevant in policy design. Independently of ￿, the best policy
strategy consists of focusing on the domestic output gap, i.e. it is ‘inward looking.’ In a Nash
equilibrium, the nominal exchange rate ￿uctuates with relative productivity shocks | driving
movements in the terms of trade. The real exchange rate however is less volatile, depending on
Home bias.
An additional property of this PCP economy is that maximizing jointly the Home and
Foreign expected utility would not alter the attributes of optimal policy rules relative to the
Nash equilibrium. While the Home and Foreign objective functions are not identical, combining
























It easy to verify that the ￿rst order conditions for a cooperative equilibrium are the same as in
a Nash equilibrium: there are no gains from coordination | a result similar to Obstfeld and
Rogo￿ (2002) and Corsetti and Pesenti (2005).
5. Openness, volatility and the international dimension of optimal mon-
etary policy
The PCP model has been questioned by pointing to empirical evidence documenting the extent
of the local currency price stability of imports | which is incompatible with the exchange rate
playing a role as stabilizer of relative prices between imports and domestic goods. While there
is a considerable debate on the relative importance of real and nominal factors in determining
the local currency price stability of imports, I will make my argument abstracting from real
considerations altogether. As discussed in Corsetti and Pesenti [2005b], nominal frictions in
local currency are an argument in favor of an international dimension in the optimal design of
monetary policy rules. Below, I will formally show how this argument depends on the degree of
openness in the economy.
In an economy with LCP, p(h) and p￿(f) will still be optimally determined charging a ￿xed



































What matters is expected marginal costs expressed in the currency of the importing countries.
Clearly, the law of one price does not necessarily hold: exchange rate ￿uctuations will generally
drive prices at Home and abroad apart (implicitly, we are assuming that arbitrage in the goods
10market is not feasible). Moreover, as prices are sticky in local currency, exchange rate pass-
through is zero.
In the LCP case, it is well understood that nominal depreciation in response to a positive
domestic productivity shocks moves relative prices in the opposite direction with respect to the
￿exible price equilibrium. The terms of trade appreciate, rather than worsening, so that the
international transmission of monetary policy is negative. There are no e￿cient expenditure
switching e￿ects. As exchange rate movements are not e￿cient, we will see below that the best
conduct for monetary policy is to stabilize a weighted average of domestic and foreign marginal
costs.5
When export prices are preset in local currency, the policy problem can be written as
max
￿t





t ) = Et￿1
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ln￿￿
t ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)lnP￿







Et￿1 (lnCt) = Et￿1
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Observe that in the LCP case there are no monetary spillovers, i.e. the objective function of
each country does not depend on Foreign monetary policy. The ￿rst order conditions of the


























Optimal monetary stances stabilize a weighted average of domestic and foreign marginal costs
| with weights given by the CPI weights of domestic and import good prices.6
5Observe that, according to the above expressions, optimal export prices preset in local currency falls with the
covariance between ￿rms’ productivity and the monetary stance of the import country. The logic is straightfor-
ward. Suppose that the importing country expands its money supply, depreciating its currency: the movement
of the exchange rate hurts exporters by reducing the revenue in their own currency for each sale abroad. Unless
marginal costs of these ￿rms happen to be temporarily low (productivity is temporarily high), the monetary
shock tends to reduce their pro￿t margin of ￿rms exporting into the country. By the same token, a monetary
contraction by the importing country in periods when exporters marginal costs are low tends to raise pro￿t
margins above their optimal level. Bringing this considerations together, a positive covariance between Home
monetary stance and productivity of foreign ￿rms turns out to destabilize pro￿ts. When this covariance increases,
￿rms optimally react by raising prices and lowering, on average, their sales abroad. The lower the covariance
between ￿ and Z￿, the higher the preset prices of imports.
6Rewriting the above model incorporating non-traded goods, whereas the latter goods have equal weight in the
utility function, and considering only one economy-wide shock per country, as in DO, one can derive very similar
￿rst order conditions for the policy problem. The main di￿erence is that the parameter ￿ would be replaced by
￿=2. This establishes a nice functional equivalence between the analysis above and Duarte and Obstfeld (2004).
11Home bias is now relevant for policy design. With home bias, the two ￿rst order conditions
above cannot be solved by ￿ = ￿￿, unless shocks are completely symmetric. This observation
establishes that in general a ￿xed exchange rate is not part of e￿cient stabilization rules.
Nonetheless, optimal stabilization rules generally imply a lower exchange rate variability
relative to the PCP economy. To see this, combine the ￿rst order condition above with the































Taking the limiting case ￿ ! 1, so that each country becomes e￿ectively closed to trade, the
optimal policy rules will prescribe ￿ = &Z, and ￿￿ = &￿Z￿, and the nominal exchange rate will

























This establishes that optimal stabilization policy in an economy with a small import share in
domestic demand will tend to be ‘inward-looking’, even if import prices are preset in the local
currency. The argument for an international dimension in monetary policy | re￿ecting the
need to stabilize at the margin the markups of foreign ￿rms exporting in the domestic economy
| becomes stronger in economies with a less extreme degree of home bias. Starting from the
extreme case ￿ = 1, raising openness tends to raise the reaction of domestic monetary policy to
productivity shocks abroad, implying lower exchange rate volatility.
In particular, in our symmetric world economy optimal policies with an international di-
mension translate into very limited exchange rate variability for values of ￿ around 1/2. In the
limiting case ￿ ! 1=2 (the case of no home bias) optimal policy rules actually imply that the
exchange rate is not contingent on productivity shocks at all. In this limiting case, the model
essentially becomes identical to the original Corsetti-Pesenti formulation | the case stressed by
DE. The limiting case is obviously not an argument in favor of a ￿xed exchange rate regime.7
For instance, one could observe that, even when ￿ ! 1=2, countries may have di￿erent prefer-
ences over in￿ation. This would lead monetary authorities to let the exchange rate depreciate
predictably over time, at a rate equal to the desired in￿ation di￿erential (i.e. in proportion to
&t=&￿
t ).
The relation between openness and exchange rate variability (implied by optimal stabilization
policy), however, is non linear. Consider the limit for ￿ ! 0: households strongly prefer imported
goods over domestic goods. In this economy, monetary policy makers are mostly concerned with
the marginal costs of foreign producers selling in the home market. The optimal monetary rules
7It is worth emphasizing that the exchange rate would be optimally constant in a world of n symmetric
countries, each specialized in the production of a single type of tradable goods, provided that the consumption
basket of each individual consumer is symmetrically de￿ned over every all the national goods produced in the
world.
12are such that ￿ = &Z￿, and ￿￿ = &￿Z. The exchange rate still vary with relative productivity

























This example shows that in economies that are very open to external trade, a strong \inter-
national dimension" in monetary policy does not necessarily imply a very low exchange rate
volatility.8
In all these cases, because of the absence of policy spillovers noted above, there are no
gains from policy coordination. Regardless of ￿, maximizing a weighted average of the above
objective functions will yield exactly the same optimal rules as above. As discussed by Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005a), nominal friction in local currency implies that monetary shocks have large
ex post spillovers on employment and output, but not on consumption. The spillovers on
employment are however inconsequential on the design of monetary rules under commitment,
because optimal pricing by ￿rms is such that employment will always be constant at its natural
rate in expectations (a consequence of preference speci￿cation). Without spillovers of domestic
monetary policy on consumption abroad, there is no ground for cooperative policy to improve
welfare: optimal monetary rules are identical in a Nash and in a cooperative equilibrium.9
6. Conclusion
Recent literature has amply debated whether nominal price frictions could motivate a reconsid-
eration of the received wisdom on optimal stabilization policy in open economy. To the extent
that nominal price of imports are sticky in local currency, there is an argument for choosing
policy targets less inward-oriented, depending on the degree of openness of the economy. A
large import content of domestic expenditure creates a trade-o￿ between stabilizing the mar-
ginal costs of domestic and foreign producers. Because of this trade-o￿, optimal policies will
generally imply a lower exchange rate volatility relative to the case of \inward-looking" policies.
8An economy with a very large import content in consumption is also analyzed by Gal￿ ￿ and Monacelli (2003),
who however only consider the case of PCP.
9In Canzoneri et al. (2005), asymmetric shocks to the nontraded good sector generates potentially sizeable
gains from international policy coordination. This raises the question of whether there are positive gains from
coordination in DO. The answer is negative. In the text, we have seen a case of no gains from cooperation in
LCP economies with tradables only, with or without home bias. The extension of the same result to the DO
economy with nested Cobb-Douglas consumption aggregators is straightforward. There will still be no monetary
spillovers across countries: independently of sectoral shocks, cooperative rules cannot improve upon the Nash
equilibrium with optimal stabilization rules. The presence of monetary spillovers explains instead the gains from
cooperation in the PCP version of the same economy, studied by Canzoneri et al. (2005). In either the non-
cooperative or the cooperative equilibrium, monetary authorities are inward looking, in the sense that they only
stabilize some weighted average of marginal costs in the traded and the nontraded good sectors of the national
economy. However, relative to the Nash solution, optimal monetary rules under cooperation place a larger weight
on stabilizing the traded good sector. This is because, with producer currency pricing, the international spillovers
from monetary policy are positive. In a Nash equilibrium, the Home monetary authorities fail to take into account
these spillovers when solving the policy problem. A cooperative setting addresses this failure.
13In this text I provide a simple analytical treatment of this argument, extending previous
work with Paolo Pesenti as to allow for home bias in consumption. Home bias is enough to show
that ￿xed exchange rates would impose undue constraints to the conduct of stabilization policy.
Hence, I present a case restoring the desirability of ￿exible exchange rates without relying on
a sectoral dimension of shocks emphasized in Duarte and Obstfeld (2004), or other economic
features generating domestic policy trade-o￿s (as emphasized for instance by Devereux and
Engel 2004).
With strong home bias, optimal monetary rules tend to be inward looking, generating ex-
change rates that move in proportion to the fundamental shocks hitting the Home and the
Foreign economy. The exchange rate volatility implied in optimal rule however falls as the two
economies become more symmetric: welfare- maximizing monetary authorities tend to target
similar averages of domestic and foreign goods. A non-contingent exchange rate may result in
the limiting case of perfect symmetry, but this can hardly be considered a case in favor of a
￿xed exchange rate regime.
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15Appendix 1. Derivation and analysis of the equilibrium
This appendix derives the model solution in detail. For the sake of comparison, it closely follows
the appendix in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005). There are two symmetric countries, Home and
Foreign. In each country there are households, ￿rms, and a government. Home households and
￿rms are de￿ned over a continuum of unit mass, with indexes j 2 [0;1] and h 2 [0;1]. Foreign
households and ￿rms are also de￿ned over a continuum of unit mass, with indexes j￿ 2 [0;1]
and f 2 [0;1].
Households are immobile across countries and they own national ￿rms. Firms in each country
specialize in the production of a country-speci￿c good. Each ￿rm produces a variety (brand)
of the national good which is an imperfect substitute to all other varieties under conditions of
monopolistic competition. Labor market is competitive. Markets are complete.
Households problem The one-period utility of household j is:




where Ct(j) is now a Cobb-Douglas basket (that is, a CES basket with unit elasticity) of the
Home and Foreign goods:
Ct(j) = CH;t(j)￿CF;t(j)1￿￿ (A.2)
and CH;t(j) and CF;t(j) are CES baskets of, respectively, Home and Foreign varieties (for sim-
















Note that the degree of substitution between domestic goods and imports is lower than the
degree of substitution among varieties (1 < ￿).
Since ￿ will be the share of consumption spending falling on domestic goods, any ￿ > 1=2
implies Home bias in consumption. Di￿erent from the original formulation of the model, I now
allow for Home bias. Namely, in the one-period utility ￿ow of Foreign household j￿: period
utility of household j￿ is:
U￿
t (j￿) = lnC￿








t (j￿) will be a Cobb-Douglas basket with symmetric Home bias:
C￿

























iThis implies that, for given Home-currency prices of the varieties, pt(h) and pt(f), the
utility-based CPI, Pt, is de￿ned as:
Pt =
1







































































and the optimal composition of nominal spending is:
PH;tCH;t(j) = ￿PtCt(j); PF;tCF;t(j) = (1 ￿ ￿)PtCt(j) (A.12)
For the Foreign country we have instead:


































F;t(j￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)P￿
t C￿
t (j￿) (A.15)
The Home representative household j own the portfolio of Home ￿rms, hold the Home cur-
rency, M, receive wages, Wt‘t(j), and pro￿ts from the ￿rms, Pt(j), and pay non-distortionary
(lump-sum) net taxes NETT, denominated in Home currency. With complete markets, it also
owns a Arrow-Debreu securities.
iiThe optimality conditions for the Home representative households with respect to Ct(j),
Mt(j) and ‘t(j) are
1
Ct(j)
￿ Dt(j)Pt = 0 (A.16)
￿
Mt(j)
￿ Dt(j) + ￿EtDt+1(j) = 0 (A.17)
￿￿ + WtDt(j) = 0 (A.18)
where Dt(j) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the ￿ow budget constraint at time
t. From (A.16), Dt(j) measures the increase in household j’s utility (shadow price) associated
with one additional unit of nominal wealth. Workers equate the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure, ￿Ct(j), to the real wage in consumption units, Wt=Pt. Note
that, with a common CPI index, the previous expression implies equalization of consumption
across agents, or:
Ct(j) = Ct; Dt(j) = Dt; Qt;t+￿(j) = Qt;t+￿. (A.19)
The problem of the foreign representative household is similarly de￿ned. Similar conditions hold
for the Foreign representative household.
Let Et denote the nominal exchange rate (de￿ned as units of Home currency per unit of
Foreign currency). With complete markets the rate of growth of marginal utility is equal to the













































t = constant ￿ Et￿￿
t (A.23)
In a symmetric world, Home and Foreign consumption are ex ante identical, hence the constant
in the above expression is equal to one. The equilibrium exchange rate is therefore equal to the





=) PtCt = EtP￿
t C￿
t . (A.24)
iiiTechnology and resource constraints The production functions in the two countries are
linear in labor:
Yt(h) = Zt‘t(h) Y ￿
t (f) = Z￿
t ‘￿
t(f) (A.25)
where Zt and Z￿
t are two country-speci￿c productivity processes. Note that the resource con-
















































































Similarly we can obtain total demand for Foreign variety f.
Price setting Home ￿rm h minimizes costs Wt‘t(h) subject to the above technology: the
Lagrangian multiplier associated with this problem is the nominal marginal cost MCt(h), equal
to:








Firms operating under conditions of monopolistic competition take into account the downward-
sloping demand for their product (A.30) and set prices to maximize their value. Firms are small,
in the sense that they ignore the impact of their pricing and production decisions on aggregate
variables and price indexes.




















































Consider ￿rst the case of an economy with ￿exible prices. Home ￿rms set prices to







Both prices are equal to the marginal cost augmented by a constant markup ￿=(￿ ￿ 1). The law
of one price holds, as the same good h sells at the same price in both markets when expressed
in terms of the same currency.
Suppose now ￿rms are subject to nominal rigidities. For simplicity, assume that at time
t ￿ 1, ￿rms preset the price(s) at which they sell their good in the Home and Foreign countries
at time t (only for one period). They do so by maximizing the value of the ￿rm, i.e. expected
discounted pro￿ts Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)).
















Recalling that Qt￿1;t = ￿Pt￿1Ct￿1=PtCt, CH;t = ￿PtCt=PH;t, and observing that all prices
pt(h) are symmetric, thus




p(h) is a markup over expected marginal costs.
What about the Foreign-currency price p￿
t(h)? Logically, it can be set in two di￿erent
ways, depending on the speci￿c currency in which Home exports are priced.
First, we consider the case of ‘producer currency pricing’ (PCP): exports are priced and
invoiced in domestic (producer’s) currency, ￿rm h maximizes Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)) with respect
vto Etp￿























































Recalling that Qt￿1;t = ￿Pt￿1Ct￿1=PtCt, C￿







, and observing that
all prices Etp￿










H;t move one-to-one with the nominal exchange rate, leaving the export
price EtP￿
H;t unchanged when expressed in Home currency. In other words, there is full exchange
rate pass-through. The law of one price holds. Domestic goods have the same price (in the same
currency) everywhere. No arbitrage is possible.
Consider next a model with ‘local currency pricing’ (LCP): the export price is preset in
Foreign currency, ￿rm h maximizes expected discounted pro￿ts Et￿1 (Qt￿1;tPt(h)) with respect
to p￿




































This is in general di￿erent from
PH;t
Et , i.e. exchange rate movements will induce deviations from
the law of one price. Home export prices expressed in Foreign currency do not move when the
exchange rate changes. Pass through is zero. Note the implicit assumption: arbitrage is not
possible.
viGovernment and monetary policy indicator There is no public spending: the government
uses seigniorage revenues and taxes to ￿nance transfers. The public budget constraint is simply:
Mt ￿ Mt￿1 +
Z 1
0
NETTt(j)dj = 0 (A.40)
and in equilibrium money supply equals demand, or Mt =
R 1
0 Mt(j)dj.
As in Corsetti and Pesenti (2005a,b), we take ￿ and ￿￿ as our indicator of monetary stance
at Home and abroad.
A synthesis of the model The resource constraint for the Home output is:














































The resource constraint can then be written synthetically as:
Ct = Zt‘t￿t (A.43)
The variable ￿t is an index of international spillovers, re￿ecting the macroeconomic impact of






















Now, using the resource constraint with optimal prices, it is easy to see that, absent nominal





= ￿ ‘ (A.46)
In the presence of nominal rigidities, instead, full employment holds only on average:
Et￿1 (‘t) = Et￿1 (‘￿
t) = ￿ ‘ (A.47)
viiregardless of export pricing.
We are now ready to summarize our model in a table. Given the exogenous variables Zt,
Z￿
t , ￿t, ￿￿
t and the prices PH;t, PF;t, P￿
H;t, P￿
F;t, the macroeconomics of the two-country model
is described by the system of 13 equations in 13 endogenous variables Et, Pt, P￿
t , Ct, C￿
t , ￿t, ￿￿
t ,
‘t, ‘￿
t, CH;t, CF;t, C￿
H;t, and C￿



















































PH;tCH;t = ￿PtCt PF;tCF;t = (1 ￿ ￿)PtCt
P￿
H;tC￿








To close each model (depending on the assumption about pricing) we have to add optimal prices.
























































































































Irrelevance of complete market assumption Following the same logic as in Corsetti and
Pesenti (2001), it can be shown that the allocation is the same if ￿nancial markets are incomplete,
as long as in the economy there is no outstanding debt inherited from the past. In particular,
suppose there is international trade in one bond, denominated in domestic currency. The ￿rst
order conditions of the Home and Foreign agents with respect to bond holdings can be written
1
￿t






























the uncovered interest parity conditions. On the other hand, the expressions for the current
account at Home and abroad are
Bt+1 = ￿ ￿ PHYH
￿Bt+1 = Et￿￿ ￿ EtP￿
FY ￿
F
where we assume that the inherited stock of debt from the past is zero, It is easy to verify that
Bt = 0 and Et =
￿t
￿￿
t solve the above equations.
International transmission With ￿exible prices we have
‘ = ￿ ‘; ) YH = Z￿ ‘
C = Z￿ ‘￿ =
Z￿ ‘

















￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿
￿ ‘
C￿ = Z￿￿ ‘￿￿￿ =
Z￿￿ ‘￿











￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿
￿ ‘￿
Transmission of productivity shocks is ‘positive.’ As Home country is better o￿ because of higher
productivity, Foreign also bene￿t via an improvements of their terms of trade. Nominal shocks
























































Ct = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)










ixHome productivity shocks only a￿ect Home employment (labor ‘gap’). Monetary policies have
spillovers on consumption, but not on output abroad. A depreciation of Et deteriorates the
Home terms of trade: monetary transmission is positive. Consumption moves together but not
proportionally.
Under PCP, the terms of trade PF=EP￿
H are equal to P￿
FE=PH. Since PH and P￿
F are preset,
the Home terms of trade worsens with a nominal depreciation of the Home currency (i.e. a higher
E). When the Home currency weakens, Home goods are cheaper relative to Foreign goods in
both the Home and the Foreign country. As demand shifts in favor of the goods with the lowest
relative price, world consumption of Home goods increases relative to consumption of Foreign
goods. These are referred to as ‘expenditure switching e￿ects’ of exchange rate movements.




























Productivity only a￿ect domestic employment. Monetary policies have spillovers on output and
employment overseas. Since prices are preset in local currency, a depreciation of Et improves the
Home terms of trade PF=EP￿
H: it increases Home exporters’ sales revenue and reduces Foreign
exporters’ sales revenue, without e￿ects on consumer prices. Thus, a depreciation of Et has now
a positive impact on ￿t and negative on ￿￿
t { the opposite of the PCP case:
￿t =































There are no monetary spillovers on consumption. A home monetary shock raise C at Home
and ‘￿ abroad: ‘beggar-thy-neighbor’ transmission of monetary policy.







C￿ = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)








With prices preset in local currency, exchange rate ￿uctuations do not a￿ect the relative price
faced by importers and consumers. There is no ‘expenditure switching e￿ect’ of exchange rate
movements.
x